Abstract-As RFID applications are entering our daily life, many new security and privacy challenges arise. However, current research in RFID security focuses mainly on simple authentication and privacy-preserving identification. In this paper, we discuss the possibility of widening the scope of RFID security and privacy by introducing a new application scenario. The suggested application consists of computing statistics on private properties of individuals stored in RFID tags. The main requirement is to compute global statistics while preserving the privacy of individual readings. PPS assures the privacy of properties stored in each tag through the combination of homomorphic encryption and aggregation at the readers. Re-encryption is used to prevent tracking of users. The readers scan tags and forward the aggregate of their encrypted readings to the back-end server. The back-end server then decrypts the aggregates it receives and updates the global statistics accordingly. PPS is provably privacypreserving. Moreover, tags can be very simple as they are not required to perform any computation, but only to store data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification tags are low cost wireless devices that were aimed to identify products along the different steps of the supply chain without the need for line of sight. Due to its cost and time effectiveness, RFID tags have gained more and more popularity in many applications, such as access control, product tracking, item identification, and counterfeiting detection. Most of the work on RFID security and privacy has focused on lightweight authentication, identification, and formal security and privacy models in RFID settings [2, 4, 5, 8, 17, [20] [21] [22] .
The paper at hand focuses on a new RFID application scenario which raises new requirements beyond the authentication and identification issues. We focus on the problem of collecting statistics over private properties of a population of individuals while assuring the privacy of these individuals with respect to their properties. A typical real-world application example of this problem is the computation of customer statistics using special RFID-based membership or loyalty cards. A main requirement is the protection of the customer's identity and privacy during computation.
To tackle this problem, we present a new protocol called PPS ("Privacy-Preserving Statistics"). In PPS, each RFID tag stores the properties of its holder in an encrypted form. Intermediate parties called readers collect encrypted properties from tags, compute aggregates over encrypted readings without decrypting them, and periodically forward the result of such aggregation operations to the back-end server. The server is then able to derive the global statistics by decrypting the aggregates it receives from the readers. PPS involves the following entities:
• Issuer I: the issuer initializes each tag by writing into the tag's memory an encrypted representation of the properties of the tag holder.
• Tags {T i }: each tag stores an encrypted representation of different properties of the tag holder. More precisely, the encrypted representation of p different properties P i ∈ {true, false}, 1 ≤ i ≤ p, is stored in the tag, where P i is set to "true", if the tag holder possesses the property P i .
• Readers {R i }: readers are in charge of collecting properties stored on tags. They read the data stored on each tag and forward the result of these readings to the back-end server.
• A back-end server S: S processes the aggregate data received from readers and derives some global statistics such as distribution of attendance rate with respect to event types and population characteristics.
The main requirement for S is to count the number of tag holders satisfying each property P i for all the properties. The main concern is to gather statistics while preserving the privacy of tag holders. Neither readers nor the back-end server should be able to disclose the values of a tag holder's properties. The main intuition to ensure privacy in PPS is to combine both encryption and aggregation. The list ω i of the tag holder properties are encrypted as E(ω i ) and stored on the tag. Through subsequent readings of tags in its range, the reader computes the aggregate of the ciphertexts received from the tags, E(ω i ), and periodically forwards the encrypted aggregate value to the back-end server.
Since the back-end server S can decrypt, readers must aggregate the ciphertexts received from the tags in their range before forwarding the encrypted data to S. Note that forwarding each individual reading to the server would strongly overload typically embedded, low capacity readers.
Even though the privacy of properties is assured through encryption, unlinkability of tags, as defined by Chatmon et al. [7] , has to be assured, too. Unlinkability prevents the readers or eavesdropping adversaries from tracking tags over different sessions; an adversary should never be able to link two responses of the same tag over different sessions. Therefore, data sent by the tags should be different at each reading. Reencryption is used to that effect. In Section II-B, we formally define the notion of unlinkability.
The major contributions of PPS are: 1.) contrary to related work on RFID tag identification, PPS provides an RFID-based mechanism to collect statistics over a set of properties in a privacy-preserving manner.
2.) formal proofs of privacy and unlinkability against eavesdroppers, malicious readers, and curious back-end servers.
3.) minimal hardware requirements resulting in cheap tags: PPS does not require tags to do any cryptographic computation, tags are passive, i.e., battery-less and only require data storage functions. Contrary to related work, PPS' storage-only requirements enable implementations on today's available EPC class1 Gen2 tags.
4.) data integrity: PPS can detect tag tampering.
II. ADVERSARY & PRIVACY MODELS
In this section, we introduce the adversary model and define formally the notions of privacy and unlinkability.
A. Adversary model
PPS protects against two different categories of adversaries ADV 1 represents external adversaries and malicious readers. We assume an active adversary who can not only eavesdrop messages, but also intercept, modify, and even initiate communication. He might even replace a tag's content by rewriting it. (Re-writing tags has some special implications on security, and we discuss this issue separately in Section V.) ADV 2 represents a malicious back-end server. A back-end server is passive in the sense that it only receives aggregates from readers. It cannot initiate communication with tags.
ADV 1 does not collude with ADV 2 . Note that in scenarios where the readers and the back-end server collude, PPS will not provide privacy.
As motivated in the introduction, the primary goal of ADV 1 or ADV 2 is to gain some knowledge about sensitive information, in this case individual tag holders' properties. We formalize this below.
B. Privacy Models
PPS borrows privacy notions for storage-only tags as originally proposed by Ateniese et al. [1] , Golle et al. [11] , and experiment-based definitions by Juels and Weis [13] .
At the end of a protocol execution, PPS is said to be privacy-preserving, if ADV 1 and ADV 2 can neither decide which properties a given tag satisfies nor link tags to previous protocol executions. In conclusion, an adversary should not have a higher chance in breaking privacy or unlinkability than simple guessing. The following oracle-like constructions exist:
O pick is an oracle that randomly selects a tag T i from all the n tags in the system.
O select is an oracle that randomly returns a tag T i from all the n tags in the system along the list S i of properties P j T i is satisfying.
O flip is an oracle that, provided with two tags T 0 , T 1 , randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and returns T b .
O aggregate computes a total of s aggregates Agg 1 , Agg 2 , . . . , Agg s , each time by randomly choosing a set of γ tags: Agg 1 is computed using tags (T Algorithm 2: Challenge 1) Privacy against ADV 1 : An adversary breaks the privacy of PPS, if given a tag T and a property P i , he can decide if a tag T satisfies the property P i or not.
To that effect, an adversary ADV 1 has access to tags in two phases. In a learning phase (Algorithm 1), ADV 1 is provided with a challenge tag T c from the oracle O pick . He can read from T c for a maximum of t times. O select gives r − 1 tags to ADV 1 along with the list S i of properties P j that each tag T i satisfies. ADV 1 can read and write into T i for a maximum of s times. After each read or write access to a tag in the learning phase, the tag is allowed to interact with a legitimate reader by a normal PPS protocol run ("EXECUTE").
In the second phase, a challenge phase (Algorithm 2), ADV 1 picks a property P i by calling a function PICKPROP-ERTY. Given the results of the different readings and T c , ADV 1 outputs a bit b, such that b = 1 if he guesses that T c satisfies P i , and b = 0 otherwise. ADV 1 succeeds, if his guess is right.
Definition 1. PPS is said to be privacy-preserving with respect to ADV 1 , if for all adversaries of category ADV 1 ,
2 + , such that is negligible. 2) Privacy against ADV 2 : As assumed above, ADV 2 , i.e., a malicious back-end server, only receives aggregates from readers. In any case, there is no relation between tags, and therewith tag holders, and ADV 2 . In conclusion, ADV 2 simply cannot learn anything about properties of tags.
While we do not target a formal proof, privacy against ADV 2 is furthermore discussed and additional reasoning is given in the according security analysis section IV-A2.
3) Unlinkability against ADV 1 : The tags targeted in this paper only feature storage capabilities. Hence, tags cannot update the content of their memory themselves after a read and, therefore, the content of a tag's memory does not change between two protocol executions. In the face of an overwhelmingly powerful adversary who can eavesdrop all communications between tags and readers, tags would be trivially linkable. However, we conjecture that it is fair to assume that an adversary in the real world cannot continuously monitor tags and that there is at least one protocol execution that is "un-observed" by the adversary. Once a tag T is rewritten outside the range of the adversary, the adversary should not be able to link the previous interactions he has seen to tag T . In accordance with notions of related work such as: insubvertible encryption by Ateniese et al. [1] , backward security by Dimitrou [8] , and privacy against anonymizers by Sadeghi et al. [18] , we assume that there is at least one protocol
Algorithm 4: Challenge execution that takes place outside the range of the adversary. Under this assumption, neither external adversaries nor readers are be able to link two responses from the same tag once it is re-written outside their range.
More formally, in a learning phase (Algorithm 3), ADV 1 is provided with r random tags from O pick . ADV 1 can read from and write into the r tags for a maximum of s times. After each read or write access, the tags interact with legitimate readers by a PPS execution ("EXECUTE").
In the challenge phase (Algorithm 4), ADV 1 is provided with two challenge tags T 0 , T 1 that he is allowed to write into and read from for a maximum of t times. After each access to T 0 and T 1 by ADV 1 , T 0 and T 1 interacts with a legitimate reader (EXECUTE).
Then, O flip is queried with T 0 and T 1 , O flip provides ADV 1 with T b . Given the results of the readings and T b , the adversary ADV 1 guesses the value of b ∈ {0, 1}. He succeeds, if his guess is right.
Definition 2. PPS is said to provide unlinkability with respect to ADV 1 , if for all adversaries of category ADV 1 , Pr[ADV 1 succeeds] ≤ 1 2 + , such that is negligible. 4) Unlinkability against ADV 2 : An adversary ADV 2 should not be able to link aggregates to aggregates it has received before. More precisely, a malicious back-end server should not tell, whether a received aggregate involves a tag that was involved in another aggregate received earlier. ADV 2 has access to the system in two phases. During learning (Algorithm 5), O aggregate provides ADV 2 with s aggregates Agg 1 , . . . , Agg s that he could decrypt.
In the challenge phase (Algorithm 6), ADV 2 outputs a pair b, b ∈ {1, . . . , s} and therewith Agg b and Agg b . 
III. PPS
To encrypt the properties in PPS, we use Elgamal [9] . Elgamal is a multiplicatively homomorphic encryption and therefore allows ciphertexts aggregation at the readers. Being probabilistic, Elgamal allows readers to re-encrypt the data sent from the tags and hence counters linking attacks. However, the target scenario of our application calls for an additive homomorphism, and thus Elgamal alone falls short of suiting the target application. Therefore, we use Gödel encoding [10] to encode the tag properties into one message and to adapt Elgamal to our application 1 .
A. Elgamal Cryptosystem 1) Setup: the system outputs two large prime P and Q. Let G be a subgroup of Z * P of order Q, and g be a generator of G. All arithmetic operations will be performed mod P .
2) Key generation: the secret key sk is x ∈ Z Q . The public key pk is y = g
To adapt Elgamal to our scheme, we encode the properties using Gödel encoding before encryption as follows.
B. Gödel Property Encoding
To efficiently encode the tag holder properties, we assign to each property P i a prime number p i . Both, properties P i and primes p i are publicly known.
• Setup: let P i , 1 ≤ i ≤ p, be the p properties the backend server is interested in, and p i are p different primes. Each property P i is mapped to one p i .
• Encoding: let m be the vector (ν 1 , ..., ν p ) such that ν i = 1, if the tag T fulfills the property P i , otherwise ν i = 0. The encoding of the properties of the tag T is defined as
Note that this encoding is homomorphic:
• Decoding: factorization of Ω(m) yields the p different factors p νi i and therewith properties P i .
C. Protocol
Overview: In PPS, the tags are initialized once by the issuer. Whenever a tag T is read by a reader R, the reader aggregates the ciphertext c = (u, v) it receives from T , then it reencrypts the ciphertext c and writes the new ciphertext into T . Periodically, readers in the system forward their aggregates to the back-end server. The latter decrypts and decodes the aggregates and computes the statistics it is interested in.
We assume that the system comprises, for ease of understanding, a single reader, and it has γ tags in its range.
• System setup: the output of the setup operation is a pair of keys (pk, sk): (y = g x , x), x ∈ Z Q , and p primes p i such that the property P i corresponds to prime number p i . Elgamal secret key sk = x is known by both the issuer and the backend server. Generator g, the public key pk = y and the p primes are made public.
• Tag initialization: the input comprises vector m = (ν 1 , ..., ν p ), public key y, p primes p i , and random number r ∈ Z Q . Issuer I encodes the vector m following the Gödel encoding and computes ω = Ω(m). The output of the initialization operation is a ciphertext (u, v) = (g r , y r ω). • Aggregation: provided with a set of γ ciphertexts (u i , v i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ γ received from tags in its range. The reader outputs the aggregate (U, V ) = (
• Re-encryption: upon receiving a ciphertext (u, v) = (g r , y r ω) from a tag T , the reader picks a random number r ∈ Z Q and computes a new ciphertext (u , v ) = (g (r+r ) , y (r+r ) ω). Note that a value y (r+r ) ω = 0 mod P is considered "forbidden". When a reader reads a tag that stores 0, it discards the tag. This means that the reader does not aggregate or re-encrypt the tag.
• Decryption and decoding: upon receiving the ciphertext To get the total number of tags satisfying a property P i in the case of multiple readers, the back-end server sums the ν i for all the readers in the system. Aggregation under restrictions: To ensure the correctness of statistics obtained by the back-end server, we cannot allow the readers to aggregate an infinite number of ciphertexts. They can only aggregate up to a threshold γ of ciphertexts c i = E(ω i ) at a time, such that γ i=1 ω i < P . Evaluation: Given p properties P i and p primes p i , the threshold γ is defined as
, typically |P | = 1024 bits. Furthermore, if readers send to the back-end server the number of tags they read, we can reduce the number of primes used in the Gödel encoding to represent the different properties. For example, this applies in the case with complementary properties, such as (P 1 , P 2 ) = (male, f emale). A sample Gödel encoding of a card holder's private properties for an imaginary loyalty card is presented in Table I . Given the total number of tags read and the number of tag holders satisfying P 1 , we deduce the number of tag holders satisfying P 2 . This leads to a more efficient property encoding and thus a larger aggregate size γ which improves the privacy of PPS against ADV 2 as discussed in Section IV-B2.
IV. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
This section provides formal proofs for PPS's privacy and unlinkability as defined in the models of Section II-B.
In this section, we use two additional oracles: O semantic is provided with two plaintexts ω 0 , ω 1 , randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1}, encrypts ω b using Elgamal and public key pk, and returns the resulting ciphertext c b .
O semantic−re is provided with two Elgamal ciphertexts c 0 , c 1 , randomly chooses b ∈ {0, 1}, re-encrypts c b using public key pk, and returns the resulting ciphertext c b .
A. Privacy 1) Privacy against ADV 1 : Theorem 1. PPS is privacy-preserving with respect to ADV 1 under the DDH assumption over G.
Proof: Assume we have an adversary A ∈ ADV 1 who breaks the privacy experiment. We build an adversary A that executes A as a subroutine and breaks the semantic security of Elgamal which leads to a contradiction under DDH. In this proof, we make use of the fact that a tag T satisfies a property P i , iff the corresponding prime number p i divides the plaintext underlying the ciphertext stored on T .
− A picks p properties P i that he maps to p distinct primes p i . Then, A computes n Gödel encodings ω j using the primes p i . Finally, he encrypts ω j using Elgamal and gets n ciphertexts that he stores on the tags.
− A specifies two plaintexts ω 0 = p ν0,i i ≤ P − 1 and
and b ∈ {0, 1}: ν b ,i ∈ {0, 1} and ν 0,i +ν 1,i = 1. In terms of properties P i , this means that tag T 0 , storing plaintext ω 0 , and tag T 1 , storing ω 1 , do not have a property in common.
The adversary A should specify ω 0 and ω 1 such that ν 0,i + ν 1,i = 1. Otherwise, A could choose a challenge property P i that both ω 0 and ω 1 encode. In this case, the output of A about P i will not provide the necessary information to A to break the semantic security of Elgamal. The same holds if A chooses a property P i that neither ω 0 nor ω 1 encode.
− A transmits {ω 0 , ω 1 } to the oracle O semantic . − O semantic returns the encryption c b of one of the plaintexts ω 0 , ω 1 to A . − A writes c b into a challenge tag T c . Then, A calls the adversary A that enters the learning phase. Simulating O select , A provides A with r − 1 tags along with the list of properties they are satisfying. A is allowed to read and write into these tags for a maximum of s times. A provides A as well with the challenge tag T c . A has only read access to T c and he is allowed to read it for a maximum of t times. Tags are required to interact with a legitimate reader through the function EXECUTE after being read or written into. As pk is public, A can simulate successfully EXECUTE.
− A selects a property P i and outputs 1, if T c satisfies P i and 0 otherwise.
If A outputs 1, this implies that the prime number p i corresponding to P i divides ω b . By construction, ω 0 and ω 1 do not have any prime divisor in common, and therefore, ω b is the plaintext dividable by p i .
If A outputs 0, this implies that p i does not divide ω b and by construction p i divides ω 1−b . Therefore, ω b is the plaintext that is not dividable by p i .
A can tell which plaintext ω b corresponds to c b . This breaks the semantic security of Elgamal ensured under the DDH assumption [19] , which leads to a contradiction.
2) Privacy against ADV 2 : As stated in Section II-A, ADV 2 receives only aggregated ciphertexts. Still, given the aggregates, ADV 2 can learn some information about the properties of tags read by readers, but is never able to tell which tag, and therewith which holder satisfies which property.
For instance, if ADV 2 receives an encrypted aggregate from a reader R, and decrypts it to Agg = p i=1 p νi i , and ∃j such that ν j = 0 after factorization, ADV 2 can learn that all the tags that were read by R do not satisfy the property P j .
However, as ADV 1 and ADV 2 do not collude, ADV 2 cannot tell which tag satisfies or does not satisfy a certain property P i .
B. Unlinkability 1) Unlinkability against ADV 1 : Theorem 2. PPS provides tag unlinkability against ADV 1 under the DDH assumption over G.
Proof:
The semantic security property of Elgamal encryption can be extended to the semantic security of Elgamal under re-encryption [11] . Let A be an adversary that chooses two ciphertexts c 0 and c 1 , A then sends {c 0 , c 1 } to O semantic−re . O semantic−re flips a coin b, re-encrypts c b to c b and returns c b to A . The semantic security of Elgamal under re-encryption entails that guessing the value of b is as difficult as DDH, see Golle et al. [11] . Now, assume we have an adversary A ∈ ADV 1 whose advantage to break the unlinkability experiment is not negligible. We construct a new adversary A that executes A and breaks Elgamal's semantic security under re-encryption.
− A picks p properties p i , 1 ≤ i ≤ p that he maps to p distinct primes p i , 1 ≤ i ≤ p. Then, he initializes n tags.
− A calls the adversary A that enters the learning phase. A simulates O pick and provides A with r tags. A is allowed to read and write into these tags for a maximum of s times. After each reading, A simulates EXECUTE and re-encrypts the ciphertexts, as pk is public.
− A enters the challenge phase: A simulates O pick and submits tags T 0 and T 1 to the adversary A. A writes into and reads from T 0 and T 1 for a maximum of t times. A can simulate successfully the function EXECUTE as pk is public.
− A reads the data stored on T 0 and T 1 . Without loss of generality, let c 0 (c 1 resp.) denotes the ciphertext stored on T 0 (T 1 resp.). Then, A transmits c 0 and c 1 to the oracle O semantic−re .
− O semantic−re returns the result c b of re-encrypting one of the two ciphertexts to A . A writes c b into a tag T .
− A calls A and provides him with T , simulating O flip . Then, A outputs his guess for the value of b.
Since A's advantage in the unlinkability experiment is not negligible, A can tell which tag corresponds to the new ciphertext c b . If A outputs 0, this means that c b is re-encryption of c 0 , otherwise c b is a re-encryption of c 1 . Therefore, A can break the semantic security under re-encryption of Elgamal that is ensured under the DDH assumption [11] , again leading to a contradiction.
2) Unlinkability against ADV 2 : Theorem 3. PPS provides unlinkability of tags against ADV 2 for large γ.
. Now, given a sufficiently large γ, the aggregates received by the back-end server will be completely blinded with high probability.
Therefore, the back-end server cannot distinguish between the tags involved in the aggregates. Moreover, using a large s in the learning phase would not give the adversary ADV 2 a greater advantage in guessing (b, b ) .
In the following, we compute an upper bound of the advantage of ADV 2 in the unlinkability experiment. Let E be the event that aggregate Agg is completely blinded, so ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ p : ν i > 0. Let γ be the number of ciphertexts participating in the aggregate, and π i is the probability that a tag holder satisfies property P i . Without loss of generality, we assume π 1 ≤ π 2 ≤ . . . ≤ π p . Then, the probability that
γ . = P r(E) is the advantage of ADV 2 in the unlinkability experiment which is negligible in γ. Therefore, we say that PPS is -unlinkable against ADV 2 , such that ≤ p (1 − π 1 ) γ . Note that the advantage of ADV 2 heavily depends on the probability π 1 . If π 1 is very small, i.e., representing a rare property such as being disabled, PPS cannot provide unlinkability against ADV 2 . In such a case, the back-end server can link tags to aggregates. For instance, if the backend server sees two aggregates where the property "disabled" is satisfied, it can guess with a non negligible probability that these two aggregates have one tag in common.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS Tags in our scheme only feature (re-)writable memory. As there is no access control on tags to check the authenticity of readers re-writing their memory, such a setup is vulnerable to "malicious writing". Malicious writing affects the correctness of the results obtained at the back-end server. Given that access control is not feasible in our read-write only tags, this attack cannot be prevented. We can divide malicious writing attacks into two categories:
• Writing an invalid ciphertext ("garbage") into the tag: this attack can be detected at the back-end server, as decryption and Gödel decoding will not succeed. Moreover, if the adversary writes the value 0 into the tag, this will be detected at the next honest reader to read the tag.
• Writing a valid ciphertext into the tag: a malicious reader could try to alter statistics. The simplest way to implement such an attack is by copying the content of a tag into another one ("cloning"). Since the ciphertext written into the tag is a valid one, this type of attack cannot directly be detected at decryption, and we will tackle it in the following.
Instead of one ciphertext, each tag stores two ciphertexts (c, c ID ) . The first ciphertext c encrypts the properties of the tag holder as described in the previous section. The second ciphertext c ID encrypts a unique ID of the tag using standard Elgamal encryption. After a tag is scanned by a reader, the reader re-encrypts both ciphertexts c and c ID and writes the new ciphertexts into the tag. The reader aggregates c and keeps a record of c ID . During decryption at the back-end server, if the back-end server suspects that a received aggregate is not correct, he contacts a "trusted third party". This trusted third party (TTP) checks the records c ID stored at the readers. TTP decrypts these ciphertexts and gets the IDs of the tags that were scanned along with the corresponding properties of their holders. In this manner, the TTP detects tag cloning as the ID of the cloned tag will be repeated several times.
Furthermore, in order to detect tag tampering, the tag issuer should keep a database of the tag IDs and their corresponding properties and reveal it to the TTP. Therewith, the TTP can compare the decrypted properties and the actual properties stored in the issuer database. If there is a discrepancy between the properties corresponding to the same tag ID, the TTP reports a fraud. Meanwhile, the TTP does not reveal the records of the IDs stored on the readers either to the backend server or to the readers.
VI. RELATED WORK
Juels et al. [14] utilize re-encryption to protect privacy of RFID-enabled banknotes. Each time a banknote is spent, the readers in shops or banks re-encrypt the encrypted serial number of the banknote stored on the tag. The main drawback of this scheme is that the authorized readers have access to the plaintext underlying the ciphertext spoiling unlinkability. Similarly, Golle et al. [11] introduce universal re-encryption allowing special re-encryption without knowing the public key initially used to encrypt the plaintexts. While this protocol provides key privacy, it fails at providing unlinkability after malicious writing. An adversary can write his own message m into a tag and encrypt it under its public key. Therewith, the adversary can always link the tag.
Ateniese et al. [1] tackle the above problems by proposing insubvertible encryption, i.e., universal re-encryption and randomized certificates. If the certificate is valid, the ciphertext stored on the tag will be re-encrypted. Otherwise, it will be replaced by a dummy encryption. Ateniese et al. [1] aim at privacy preserving identification, but not privacy preserving statistics collection which is the focus of PPS. Also, Ateniese et al. [1] , as well as the results presented by Blundo et al. [3] , require special message encodings to map messages to points on elliptic curves. However, currently known efficient encoding schemes fail at preserving the homomorphic properties that are the essential prerequisite for PPS.
Camenisch and Groß [6] propose attribute encoding for anonymous credentials. This allows users to prove possession of certain attributes while preserving the privacy of the users. While such an approach could be used to "emulate" privacypreserving computation of statistics, the main drawback is the requirement for complex interactive proofs between tags and readers -infeasible with storage-only tags.
Han et al. [12] present a protocol to estimate the total number of tags in the vicinity of a reader. The main idea is to infer this number by examining the number of empty and collision slots in the framed slotted Aloha protocol used for communication. Although [12] enables estimating the total number of tags anonymously, it does not lend itself to collect statistics on tag properties as targeted in the paper at hand.
Kerschbaum et al. [15] propose to privately compute performance properties of an RFID supply chain using data stored on tags. However, this work focuses on computing these metrics without leaking sensitive information of the supply-chain's parties. Kerschbaum et al. [15] use additive homomorphic encryption that does not support collecting statistics on multiple properties and consequently cannot be as efficient as PPS.
